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Service Oriented Architecture [1,12,13,14,15,16,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,32] 
(SOA) is an architectural style whose goal is to achieve loose coupling among interacting 
software agents. A service is the unit of work done by a service provider to achieve 
desired results for a service consumer. Web services standards and the SOA provide help 
toward opening IT infrastructures by providing a uniform way to expose the 
functionalities through standards like Web Service Description Language (WSDL) [8] 
and Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) [5], and to discover web services through 
standards like Universal Description Discovery and Integration (UDDI) [17,18]. SOA 
differs in many ways from many other distributed technologies. However, as SOA is 
becoming widely popular, it is becoming an attractive target for attackers and hackers. 
SOA works on top of the internet and therefore it is more open to attackers. SOA has the 
ability to easily communicate with customers, vendors and other systems outside the 
company. Therefore there are some vulnerability from the communication between 
service consumers and service providers. 
 
 
Detecting an attack and refusing the request of an attacker is usually the first line of 
defense to SOA attacks. Such an approach helps prevent an attacker from breaking into 
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the system. However, such an approach does not prevent or deter the attacker from trying 
again using a slightly different mechanism. In most of cases the attacker tries to automate 
the attack by writing codes which is then executed hundreds and thousands of times to 
break into the system. 
 
 
Many works have been done to secure SOA and such work continues.  Most if not all of 
the works aim to detect an attack and thereby prevent an attacker from accessing the 
system. In this thesis we proposed a different model to counter attacks. We use deception 
as a mechanism for deterring an attacker. We looked at an SOA organization and focused 
on the security issues that are relevant to SOA. Although deception cannot guarantee that 
an attack can be prevented, it slows the attacker down. In a best case scenario, the 
attacker may not detect he is being fooled. Even if an attacker becomes aware of the 
deception, it will have used up some of his resources and time. Deception also allows us 
to study the behavior of the attacker. This information can be used to design better 
security models. Deception also buys time for the defender. While the attacker is being 
deceived, the defender can enforce his security by strengthening the keys for example. 
Hence our proposed approach has many advantages. Deception works on top of intrusion 
detection because only after detecting an intrusion, can deception be used. As far as we 
are aware, no-one else has applied deception to SOA. 
 
The proposed method is thus developed to help reduce attacks on SOA services. The 
objective of this thesis is to apply deception to SOA attack and determine the 
effectiveness of deception against attacks on web services.  
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In chapter 2 we study the concepts and technical details of SOA as well as the security 
issues relevant to SOA security. Chapter 3 presents in detail the proposed approach. We 
describe the specific attacks that we implemented for our work. In Chapter 4 we specify 
the implementation details and the findings from our work; we also analyze the benefits 









2.1 Service Oriented Architecture: 
 
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) is an architectural style whose goal is to achieve 
loose coupling among interacting software agents. A service is a small or large unit of 
work done by a service provider to achieve the desired output for a service consumer. 
Both service provider and consumer are roles played by software agents from their 
respective sides on behalf of their owners. The idea of SOA departs significantly from 
that of object oriented programming (OOP), which suggests that data and its processing, 
should be bound together. An application's business logic or individual functions are 
basically modularized and represented as services for consumer/client applications. The 
service interface is independent of the implementation. Application programmers or 
system integrators can build applications by composing one or more services without 
knowing any detail about the services' underlying implementations. For example, a 
service can be implemented either in .Net or J2EE or any other platform, and the 
application consuming the service can be on a different platform or language. However, 










Interaction Server Client 
Service Provider 
Figure 2.1: Service Oriented Architecture 
 
2.2 Benefits of Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) 
 
The concept of SOA is not new; SOA is different from existing distributed technologies. 
Almost all of the vendors have accepted it and there is an application or platform suite 
that enables SOA. SOA has a set of standards that brings better reusability of existing 
assets or investments in the enterprise and allows somebody to create applications that 
can be built on top of new and existing applications.  
 
SOA has enabled changes to applications while keeping clients or service consumers 
inaccessible from evolutionary changes that take place in the implementation of a new or 
existing service. It enables upgrading individual services or services consumers. 
However, it is not necessary to completely rewrite the code of an application or keep an 
existing system that is no longer required for the business. Lastly, SOA provides 
enterprises better elasticity for building applications and business processes in an agile 
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way by influencing existing application infrastructure to compose new services which 
will be used for the business.  
 
SOA creates firm connections with the customers and the suppliers of a business by 
allowing the creation of dynamic applications and business services which are available 
to external customers and suppliers. It increases the customer/partner satisfaction.  
  
SOA provides improved business decision making by combining access to business 
services and information into compound business applications which are dynamic as 
well. The decision makers get precise and comprehensive information. It also increases 
the flexibility of accessing the information in the form that meets their requirements.  
  
SOA gives greater employee productivity by providing smooth access to the systems and 
information. It enables business process improvement and because of that businesses can 
have greater employee productivity. Employees can address the important, value-added 
processes rather than having to be traditional to the limitations and restrictions of the 
underlying IT systems.  
 
2.3 List of Markup Languages for Web Services: 
 




Web Services Description Language (WSDL) 
Web Services Conversation Language (WSCL)  
Web template  
Web interface languages  
Web Service Modeling Language  
XML Interface for Network Services (XINS) 
 Web Services Flow Language (WSFL)  
Web Service-Metadata Exchange  
Representational State Transfer (REST) 
XML-RPC - XML Remote Procedure Call 
 
2.4 Web Services Description Language: 
 
The Web Services Description Language (WSDL) is an XML-based language that 
provides a model for describing Web services. It is an XML-based service description on 
communication using web services. WSDL defines services as collections of network 
endpoints or ports in other language.  
 
The theoretical definition of ports and messages is divided from their concrete use or 
instance, allowing the reclaiming of these definitions. A port is an association of network 
addresses with a reusable binding, and a collection of ports define a service. Messages are 
theoretical descriptions of the data which is exchanged, and port types are the theoretical 
collections of supported operations. The existing protocol and data format specifications 
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for a particular port type constitutes a reusable binding, where the messages and 
operations are then bound to an existing network protocol and message format. WSDL 
thus explains the public interface to the web service. 
 
WSDL is often used in amalgamation with XML Schema and SOAP for providing web 
services over the Internet. A client program which is connecting to a web service is able 
to read the WSDL to determine what functions are offered by the server. Any special data 
types that are used are embedded in the WSDL file in the form of XML Schema. The 
client can then use SOAP for calling one of the functions listed in the WSDL. 
 
2.5 Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI): 
 
Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI), which is a key component of 
SOA, is a platform-independent, XML-based registry for the universal business systems 
to list them on the Internet. UDDI which is an open industry scheme which is sponsored 
by OASIS, enables business systems to circulate service listings and discover each other 
and define how the services or software applications will interact over the Internet. A 
UDDI business registration consists of three components: 
 
White Pages — keeps address, contact, and known identifiers 
Yellow Pages — keeps industrial classifications on the basis of standard taxonomies 
Green Pages — keeps technical information about a services uncovered by the business  
 
 8
UDDI is a core language designed to provide access to WSDL documents describing the 
protocol bindings and message formats that are required to interact with the web services 
listed in its directory. 
UDDI 





Figure 2.2: Organization of UDDI 
 
2.6 The Web Service Protocol Stack: 
 
The Web service protocol stack is a collection of computer networking protocols that are 
used to locate, define, implement, and make Web services interact with each other. The 
Web service protocol stack contains the following: 
 
Service Transport Protocol:  
This protocol is responsible for the transportation of messages between network 
applications and it includes protocols such as Hyper Text Transport Protocol (HTTP), 
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Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), File Transfer Protocol (FTP) and Blocks 
Extensible Exchange Protocol (BEEP).  
 
XML Messaging Protocol:  
This is responsible for encoding messages in a common XML format understandable at 
any end of a network connection. Examples of this protocols are XML-RPC, WS-
Addressing, SOAP and REST.  
 
Service Description Protocol:  
Service Description Protocol is used for describing the public interface to a specific web 
service. The WSDL interface format is typically used for this purpose.  
 
Service Discovery Protocol:  
This consolidates services into a common registry such that web services can publish 
their location and description which makes it easy to discover what services are offered 
on the network. As of now UDDI is normally used for service discovery. 
 
2.7 Simple Object Access Protocol 
 
SOAP is a protocol for exchanging XML-based messages over computer networks. It 
normally uses HTTP/HTTPS. SOAP usually forms the foundation layer of the Web 
services stack. It provides a basic messaging oriented structure that more abstract layers 
can build on. There are many kinds of messaging patterns in SOAP. Most of them are 
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Remote Procedure Call (RPC) patterns, where one network node sends a request message 
to another node (client server technology), and the server immediately sends a response 
message to the client. SOAP is the descendant of XML-RPC although it uses its transport 
and interaction impartiality and the header/body/envelope from elsewhere. The SOAP 
specification is currently maintained by the XML Protocol Working Group of the WWW 
Consortium. 
 
2.8 Web Services Security: 
 
Web Services Security [6, 30, 31, 33] or WS Security in a Service oriented Architecture 
is a vital feature for technologies to be completely adopted by the industry.  
 
Remote attacks can be a key problem on a WS. These attacks are initiated from various 
sources external to the business systems. In this regards the firewalls perform well by 
blocking incoming traffic to services that should not be uncovered to the outside network.  
 
Nevertheless, hackers always break known security implementations for an enterprise. 
That’s why the deception method works very well in addition to the prevention method. 
Honeypot [2, 3] is a very good technique for trapping a hacker which is mostly used right 
after network intrusion detection system.  
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As SOA is comparatively a novel standard in today’s computer world therefore there is 
still a lack of worldwide approaches that offers a systematic development for constructing 
robust security architectures for SOA/WS-based systems.  
 
2.9 Security Implementation Aspects: 
 
Security implementation of SOA/web services includes many aspects. In order to 
maintain the robust security of the web services these factors are very important. Some of 
these aspects are as following. 
 
Authentication: Source of the request. 
Authorization: Is the authenticated source entitled to access or not. 
Privacy: Is it ok or not to release personally exclusive information to everybody. 
Integrity: Is it the original message, or tampered message. 
Confidentiality: Is the information open/close to everybody while it is in transit. 
Availability: Is it vulnerable to a denial of service [29] attack. 
Non-Repudiation: To ensure that a contract cannot later be denied by either of the parties 
involved in terms of sending/receiving message. 
Policy Administration: Ease to apply or change a security policy rule. 




2.10 Acceptance of New Web Security Standard for the Industry: 
 
As of now web service security standards are developed and maintained by several 
different organizations such as W3C, OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of 
Structured Information Standards), Liberty Alliance, and an industry forum headed by 
Microsoft and IBM. Industry forum specifications for web security are submitted to 
W3C/OASIS for maintenance and acceptance as a standard. W3C/OASIS standards 
adoption committees provide forums that unite specific industries or communities of 
users, governments, vendors, industry groups, and other standards bodies. These 
committees evaluate existing standards, articulate requirements, identify gaps, recognize 
overlaps, publish guidelines, and promote interoperability. They provide input to 
W3C/OASIS technical committees that develop pertinent specifications, and they 
recommend new efforts where needed. 
 
2.11 Common Threats to Web Services 
 
There many kinds of threats related to web services [34]. Based on the security aspects of 
Web Services the threats could be classified into following categories. 
2.11.1 Authentication 
2.11.1.1 Brute Force: 
A Brute Force attack is a programmed process of trial and error used to guess a person's 
username, password, cryptographic key or any other security token. 
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2.11.1.2 Insufficient Authentication: 
Insufficient Authentication occurs when a web service/ web site permits an attacker to 
access sensitive content or functionality without proper authentication. 
 
2.11.1.3 Weak Password Recovery Validation: 
This occurs when a web site allows an attacker to illegally obtain, change or recover 
another user's password. This is a process of guessing the unique value that identifies a 
particular session or a user. The consequences allow attackers to issue requests with the 
compromised user's privileges. 
 
2.11.2 Authorization 
2.11.2.1 Credential/Session Prediction: 
Credential/Session Prediction is a technique of hijacking a web site user. 
 
2.11.2.2 Insufficient Authorization: 
This happens when a web service /web site permits access to sensitive functionality that 
should require different access control restrictions. 
 
2.11.2.3 Insufficient Session Expiration: 
Insufficient Session Expiration happens when a web site allows an attacker to reuse old 




2.11.2.4 Session Fixation: 
This is an attack technique which forces a user's session ID to an unambiguous value. 
 
2.11.3 Client-side Attacks 
2.11.3.1 Content Spoofing: 
Content Spoofing is an attack practice which is used to trap a user into assuming that 
certain content appearing on a web site is genuine and not from an external source. 
 
2.11.3.2 Cross-site Scripting: 
Cross-site Scripting is an attack technique which forces a web service / web site to echo 
attacker-supplied executable code, which loads at a user's end. 
 
2.11.4 Command Execution 
2.11.4.1 Buffer Overflow: 
These are attacks that change the flow of an application by overwriting parts of the 
memory. 
 
2.11.4.2 Format String Attack: 
This changes the regular flow of an application by using string formatting library which 




2.11.4.3 LDAP Injection: 
LDAP Injection is an attack practice that is used to take advantage of web services / web 
sites that construct LDAP statements from user-supplied input data.  
 
2.11.4.4 OS Commanding: 
This is an attack technique used to exploit web services / web sites by executing 
Operating System commands by the manipulation of application input. 
 
2.11.4.5 SQL Injection: 
This attack technique is used to take advantage of web services/ web sites that construct 
SQL statements from user-supplied input. 
 
2.11.4.6 SSI Injection: 
This is a server-side exploit technique which allows an attacker to send code into a web 
service / web application, which will later be executed locally by the web server. 
 
2.11.4.7 XPath Injection: 
This is an attack practice used to exploit web services / web sites that construct XPath 
queries from user-supplied input. 
 
2.11.5 Information Disclosure 
2.11.5.1 Directory Indexing: 
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Automatic directory listing/indexing is a web server function which lists all of the files 
within a requested directory if the normal base file is non-operational. 
 
2.11.5.2 Information Leakage: 
In this situation a web site reveals sensitive data, such as developer comments or error 
messages, which may help an attacker in exploiting the system information. 
 
2.11.5.3 Path Traversal: 
This technique forces access to files, directories, and commands that reside outside the 
web document root directory. 
 
2.11.5.4 Predictable Resource Location 
This is an attack technique which is used to expose hidden web site content and 
functionality. 
 
2.11.6 Logical Attacks 
2.11.6.1 Abuse of Functionality: 
This is an attack technique that uses a web services’ / website's own features and 
functionality to use, defraud, or get around access controls mechanisms. 
 
2.11.6.2 Denial of Service: 
This is an attack technique with the intent of preventing a web service / web site from 
serving normal user activities. 
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2.11.6.3 Insufficient Anti-automation: 
This happens when a web service/ web site permits an attacker to automate a process that 
is supposed to be performed manually. 
 
2.11.6.4 Insufficient Process Validation: 




2.12 Related Works 
 
Kevin et al developed a system called OpenFire [3] which is derived from the concept of 
a Honeypot and used in fooling hackers against network attacks. It uses deception to 
interfere with the reconnaissance phase. Unlike traditional firewalls, instead of blocking 
unwanted traffic, it accepts all traffic, forwarding unwanted messages to a cluster of 
decoy machines. To the outside, all ports and all IP addresses appear open in an OpenFire 
network. However, this work was based on deception at the network level and not on 
SOA. 
 
A lot of work has been done on SOA security. Some of these are outlined below. 




Karthikeyan et al of Microsoft Corporation designed an advisor for web service security 
policies [4] as a part of a research project of Microsoft. They identified some common 
security vulnerabilities found during security reviews of web services with policy-driven 
security. They described the design of an advisor for web services security 
configurations; they claimed it to be the first tool both to identify such vulnerabilities 
automatically and to offer remedial advice.   
 
Mohammad et al developed a method for secured SOAP message exchange technique [5] 
which is very important for secured communication in SOA. They provided a solution 
which is based on the usage of message structure information for preservation of message 
integrity. They also discussed the integrity feature of a SOAP account.   
 
Takeshi et al tried to figure out the necessary requirements for the configuration of 
security in SOA [6]. They came up with refining security requirements from business to 
technology, leveraging the concepts of Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) and Model-
Driven Architecture (MDA).   
 
Liang et al worked on developing a method for password based authentication key 
exchange for web services [7]. They discussed an implementation of an authenticated key 
exchange method rendered on message primitives defined in the WS-Trust and WS-
SecureConversation specifications.   
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Carlisle et al outlined a framework for implementing security for Web Services by 
extending UDDI and WSDL [8]. They presented the PWSSec (Process for Web Services 
Security) process that is composed of three stages, WSSecReq (Web Services Security 
Requirements), WSSecArch (Web Services Security Architecture) and WSSecTech (Web 
Services Security Technologies) that accomplishes the mentioned activities, respectively. 
They also provided a thorough explanation of the WSSecArch (Web Services Security 
Stage) stage intended to design the web services-based security architecture.   
 
Keromytis, A. et al presented SABER (Survivability Architecture: Block, Evade, React), 
a proposed survivability architecture [9] that blocks, evades and reacts to a variety of 
attacks by using several security and survivability mechanisms in an automated and 
coordinated fashion. It integrates several different technologies in an attempt to provide a 
unified framework for responding to the wide range of attacks malicious insiders and 
outsiders can launch. This was a kind of coordinated multi-layer approach which is 
capable of defending against attacks targeted at various levels of the network stack, such 
as congestion-based DoS attacks, software-based DoS or code-injection attacks, and 
others.   
 
Hosamani, M. et al proposed an extension of the service-oriented architecture [10] that 
provides trustworthiness means for clients to specify, service brokers to verify, and 
service implementations facilities. They discussed a prototype implementation of that 
architecture and reported preliminary results that demonstrate the potential practical value 
of the proposed architecture in real-world software applications.    
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Mecella, M. et al presented a framework for enforcing access control in conversation-
based Web services [11]. They considered the conversational nature of Web services and 








































As we saw in the previous chapter a lot of work has been done on security 
implementation of SOA services, but none of them used deception in their work. It is true 
that deception has some overheads and it can make the system slower. We need to engage 
an extra database service for providing the attacker some fake data. We also need to 
classify the request in the entry point of the system. Although deception might not be a 
full proof technique for protecting a system, it can reduce the number of attacks on a 
system. This is done in two ways. The first way is by introducing a delay for the attacker. 
This will initially create a significant service time difference between a real request and 
an attack. The second way is to provide some data which is not real. It would be initially 
hard for an attacker to recognize that the data is false. The attacker may finally figure out 
that he/she has been fooled and would try a different technique of attack on the web 
service. However, this incurs a delay and also uses the attacker’s resources, thus making 




The implementation method is based on intrusion detection on servers where a specific 
web service is running. If an intrusion is detected the request for the service is classified 
as a “false request/ unauthenticated request”. Otherwise it is classified as a “true request”.  
 
There are two database services that run for serving the requests of the service 
consumers. One database service is the real one and another is a copy of the real database 
service which is designed to provide fake data to the false request and thus acts as a 
Honeypot. However, based on the decision taken by the intrusion detection system 
(implemented in the web server) the false request is redirected to the false database 
service after a random delay which is running on an ordinary server so as not to provide 
better service quality for the attackers and thus save money for the organization.  
 
We used Microsoft Visual Studio .NET for developing the web services for the service 
oriented architecture setup, Microsoft Internet Information Server .NET for deploying the 
services, and Microsoft SQL Server 2005 / Microsoft Access 2003 as the database server. 
All the software that we used to deploy the setup was available through the MSDN 
Academic Alliance (MSDNAA) program. 
 
The intention behind this is to kill the time of the hacker and not to let him realize that his 
request has been refused. Hence, the hacker would think that he is working in the real 
world on a true database and will not try to break the system immediately. This will 




Intrusion detection server 
Fake server to trap the hacker Real enterprise server 
 
Figure 3.1: Organization of the servers 
 
 
3.1 Implemented Attack Models: 
 
When we started our work we tried of implement the system using a pure network 
intrusion detection system where the hacker or requester would be directed to the original 
service / Honeypot based on the intrusion detection system’s decision on the request. 
However, after some initial work we realized that the network intrusion prevention will 
not be sufficient for our work because a network intrusion detector would not be able to 
detect attacks specific to SOA. Therefore we decided to study about threats that are 
specific to web services only.   
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According to the classification of threats that we studied in chapter 2, we have chosen 
three categories of attacks to implement in our work. We picked up one attack from each 
category and created an attack model for them. This selection was not based on any 
specific criteria but we just wanted to implement more than one kind of attacks for our 
work. The attack categories we selected are Brute Force Attack (Authentication 
category), SQL Injection Attack (Command Execution Category) and Insufficient 
Authorization Attack (Authorization category). 
 
 
3.1.1 SQL Injection Attack 
This is an attack technique targeted at web services that construct Structured Query 
Language (SQL) queries from user-supplied input data. Almost all of the database 
enabled applications can be accessed using a SQL statement which has both ANSI and 
ISO standards.  
 
Nevertheless, many database products supporting SQL implement the basic standard and 
add their own standards as well. For example Oracle database uses the basic SQL 
standard and in addition they implement SQL Plus which is their proprietary extension. 
Web services use user-supplied input data to create their custom SQL statements for 
dynamic web page requests. However, when a web service fails to disinfect user-supplied 
input, it is likely for an attacker to change the construction of the backend SQL 
statements the web service is going to use. So, when an attacker can modify a SQL 
statement, the process will run with the same permissions in the background as the 
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component that executed the command. Therefore the impact of this attack can allow 
attackers to gain complete control of the underlying database. 
 
Example 
The simplest example of an SQL Injection can as shown below:  





      Web Service 
 
Select * from usertable 









Figure 3.2: A web based authentication form with SQL Injection 
 
SQLQuery = "SELECT Username FROM Usertable WHERE Username = '" & 
stringUsername & "' AND Password = '" & stringPassword & “’;” 
 
In this code, the system is getting the user-input from the input form and embedding it to 
an SQL query which is going to be executed in the system immediately.  
 
Suppose an attacker submits a login and password that looks like the following: 
    Login: ' OR ''=' 
    Password: ' OR ''=' 
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This will cause the resulting SQL query to become the following: 
SELECT Username FROM Users WHERE Username = '' OR ''='' AND Password = '' OR 
''='' 
 
Instead of comparing the user-supplied data with the rows in the Usertable table, the 
query will compare '' (empty string) to '' (empty string). Hence, this will return a True 
result and the attacker will be logged in as the first user in the Usertable table. 
 
There are two kinds of SQL Injection (i) Normal SQL Injection and (ii) Blind SQL 
Injection. Normal SQL Injection attack occurs by appending a union keyword with a 





The SQL server then might return an error similar to this: 
 
Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC Drivers error '80040e14'  
[Microsoft][ODBC SQL Server Driver][SQL Server]All queries in an SQL statement 




This will tell the attacker that he must now guess the correct number of columns for the 
SQL statement to work. 
 
In a Blind SQL Injection, instead of returning a database error, sometimes the server 
returns a customer-friendly error page telling the user that a mistake has been made. In 
this scenario an SQL Injection is still possible but hard to detect. However, a general way 
to detect a Blind SQL Injection is to put a false and true statement into the parameter 
value.  
 
Executing the following request to a web site: 
http://bursar.okstate.edu/payment.php?ID=2+and+0=0 should return the same web page 
as: 
http://bursar.okstate.edu/payment.php?ID=2 because the SQL statement 'and 0=0' will be 
always true.  
 
Executing the following request to a web site: 
http://bursar.okstate.edu/payment.php?ID=2+and+1=0 would then cause the web site to 
return a friendly error or no page at all. This is because the SQL statement "and 1=0" is 
always false. Now once the attacker realizes that a site is susceptible to Blind SQL 




In our approach we treated SQL injection in two ways. The first way was whether the 
injected SQL statement is a Data Definition Language (DDL). Even through we deceived 
the attacker, we didn’t allow him to run DDL SQL statements on the deception database. 
We only allowed the SQL injection for Data Manipulation Language (DML) statements 
to the deception database and deceived him. In SQL injection attack modeling in our 
work, we did intrusion detection, prevention and finally deception against an SQL 
injection attack. Nevertheless, the deception delay was introduced to any kinds of SQL 
injected requests.  
 
 
3.1.2 Brute Force Attack 
A Brute Force attack is an automatic process attack based on trial and error basis which is 
used to guess a person's username, password, credit-card number or cryptographic key, 
etc.  
 
There are numerous systems that allow the use of weak passwords or cryptographic keys, 
and users often choose an easy password which is easy to guess.  Therefore, an attacker 
automatically generates thousands of incorrect guesses to search for the valid 
username/password. When a guessed username/password allows access to the system, the 
brute force attack succeeds and the attacker gains access to the account. The same trial 
and error technique is also applicable to guess many other authorization information. 
When a web service uses a weak/small key length, it is easy for an attacker to guess a 
correct key by testing all possible combinations. 
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 Brute force attack has two types. One is the normal or generic brute force and the other 
one is the reverse brute force attack.  The first one uses a single username against 
multiple passwords.  The other one uses many usernames against a single password. 
Brute force techniques are very popular and often successful but they can take minutes, 
hours, months or years to complete. 
 
In our approach we used only the generic brute force and not the reverse brute force 
approach. We didn’t exclude intrusion detection and prevention but added deception as a 
complement to the intrusion detection and prevention approach. We detected a brute 
force attack by detecting the number of unsuccessful requests and the source of the 
request. As most systems do, we considered a request as an “attack” after three 
unsuccessful tries. Therefore, after three unsuccessful tries, the attacker was never 
allowed to work on the original database but was allowed to work on the deception 
database if any of its brute force attack succeeded. 
 
 
3.1.3 Insufficient Authorization 
This happens when a web service allows access to sensitive content or functionality that 
requires increased or special access control credentials. After a user is authenticated to a 
web service, it does not necessarily mean that he should have full access to all the 
contents and functionalities. However, authorization procedures are performed after 




In a business organization there are many levels of access qualifications to the 
information system that the business uses. As an example a web service permits a 
development office to connect to the head office where the human resources department 
employees / managers work. However an attacker may try to access confidential files 
through the web service from a computer which is not a human resources department 
computer. Therefore this access should not be granted. 
 
 
In our approach to Insufficient Authorization attack we introduced a generic delay for the 
attackers after detecting the attack. We kept authorization records for any functionalities 
supported by the web service. Therefore, anybody trying to access a functionality which 
should not be accessed by him was treated as an attack.  After the detection we redirected 
the attacker to the deception configuration and provided them the data they were trying to 










SIMULATION MODEL AND FINDINGS 
 
 
Our objective is to find the percentage of attack reduction using our proposed approach. 
We implemented our approach in a service oriented system. We believe that intrusion 
detection, redirection to fake service, puzzling the hacker, providing fake data and 
misguiding him, and finally killing some time would serve as an obstacle for a hacker to 
break into enterprise servers. Therefore, the real service would be able to reduce some 
attacks.  
 
In our setup we used Microsoft .NET technology to simulate our experiment. We created 
a basic intrusion detection server for the three attacks we decided to model. In our setup 
we had an intrusion detection service which was running on top of Internet Information 
Service (IIS). We had another client which was generating valid requests to the server. 
We also generated a series of attacks from the client end for different probability attack 
values where attacks were embedded with valid requests. 
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Figure 4.1: IIS Setup for the simulation 
 
In our work we tried to simulate an SOA setup. Our implementation was divided into 
three tiers.  
 
Web Server – We used Internet Information Server, Version 7.0. The web server was 
hosting the services on top of the application server. Figure 4.1 describes the web server 
organization. 
 
Application Server – Microsoft Visual Studio Development Server 2005 was used to 
build the application tier of the service oriented architecture. We didn’t use the concept of 
Enterprise Service Bus (ESB) for our setup but we deployed each service separately. 
Figure 4.2 shows an example of the middle tier development window. 
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Database Server – Microsoft SQL Server 2005 / Microsoft Access 2003 was used to host 
the database services for our purpose. We used a database server to host the original 
database for the enterprise and the Honeypot. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Middle-tier setup for the simulation 
 
Service Consumer- The service consumer for the web services was deployed in a 
different location which we used to generate valid requests and attacks. We didn’t use 
UDDI registry for our setup but we mapped the service consumer with the service 
provider by a service discovery file.  
 
As discussed earlier that for our work we simulated three kinds of attacks.  
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(i) SQL Injection Attack 
(ii) Brute Force Attack 
(iii) Insufficient Authorization Attack 
 
We wrote code to implement both the attack model and the intrusion model and we tested 
the models with a significant volume of data. From the simulation results we generated 
graphs that showed the delay introduced to the hacker and time of deception which 
prevented him from immediately attacking the web service.  
 
The deception strategy can redirect an attacker to many different places depending on the 
algorithm on the web server. For example, an attacker can retrieve a false credit card 
number from the database (as a part of the false data given to the attacker) and eventually 
try to buy many things with that credit card (which will never work anyway). In our 
simulation we tried to deceive the hacker in one step only. For example, in the 
implementation of Insufficient Authorization attack model if an attacker tries to get the 
directory listing of a directory which he/she is not supposed to see, the system holds the 
attacker for a particular time delay, and eventually returns the directory listing with some 
file names but those are not real of course. Therefore, we calculated the delay given to the 
attacker in the first place when he/she is trying to get the name of the files, and not what 
he/she does with the filenames later. 
 
We plotted the graphs for the data we got from our simulation results. The results came 
from the deception behavior we used in our intrusion detection server. For all three attack 
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models the server behavior was more or less the same but in the real world this might 
vary. However, the motto of our work is to reduce the attacks on a web service.   
 
(i) SQL Injection Attack 
We wrote our codes in ASP.NET and C# based on the following deception algorithm for 
SQL Injection Attack 
 
while (true) //this is a service, so it will run forever 
do 
 request=true //first treat the request as a true request 
 ddl_statement=false  //first guess that there is no DDL injection 
 
  for i=1 to number_of_fields_in_request 
  do 
   if request_field[i].contains("select from"||"group by"||"truncate  
   table"||"drop table"............) //any SQL statement is present 
   then  
    request=false   //attack 
    delay_in_seconds=random (10-100) //delay in seconds 
    pause(delay_in_seconds) //introduce a random delay 
 
    if request_field[i].contains("alter table"||"truncate   
    table"||"drop table"............) //any DDL statement 
    then  
     ddl_statement=true  //DML SQL injection  
  end if 
   end if 
  end do 
 
 if request=true then 
  connectionstring=original_database_connection_string 
 else 
  connectionstring=false_database_connection_string 
 end If 
 
 connect_to_database (connectionstring)   
 
 if ddl_statement=false  
  then result=execute SQL    //DML injection on Honeypot 
 else 
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  result="no data found" 
 end if 
 




This algorithm was run on three sets of 5000 requests from a client that we setup. The 
requests were incessant and attacks were embedded on those requests for a probability of 
0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 (Probability 0.1 means out of 10 requests one is an attack and so on). We 
got the results shown below from the simulation. The service time considered for any 
request (real request or attack) is 3 seconds. From these graphs we can clearly see that the 





























































Figure 4.5: SQL Injection Attack Findings for Attack probability of 0.3 
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(ii) Brute Force Attack 
We wrote our codes in ASP.NET and C# based on the following deception algorithm for 
Brute Force Attack 
 
while (true)  //this is a service, so it will run forever 
do 
 if try>3 then   //if three unsuccessful attemps 
  delay_in_seconds=random (10-100) //delay in seconds 
  pause(delay_in_seconds) //introduce a random delay  
  connectionstring=false_database_connection_string 
 else 
  connectionstring=original_database_connection_string 
 end if 
 
 if login(user,password)=unsuccessful //no data found for this user 
 then  
  try=try+1  //increase number of unsuccessful tries 
  return "login unsuccessful"  //return a general message to the user 
 else 
  return "login successful"  //return a general message to the user 
 end if 
end do 
 
This algorithm was run on two sets based on the password length. The first set had 676 
requests for a permutation of two password lengths for the alphabetical characters. The 
second set had 17576 requests for a permutation of three password lengths for the 
alphabetical characters. As expected the results shown below show that for a brute force 
attack it could take an attacker years to try every combination if the password length is 
more. However, the attacker would not succeed with a brute force attack after three 
unsuccessful tries. As before, we considered the service time as three seconds for any 













































Figure 4.7: Brute Force Attack Findings for password length 3 (alphabet only) 
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(iii) Insufficient Authorization Attack 
We wrote our code in ASP.NET and C# based on the following deception algorithm for 
Insufficient Authorization Attack. 
 
while (true) //this is a service, so it will run forever 
do 
 group=user_groupdetect(ip_address, user_ID); //detect the user’s functional group 
 
 //check if the user has the privilege to perform the operation 
 if requested_operation(request,group)="allowed" 
  connectionstring=original_database_connection_string 
 else 
  connectionstring=false_database_connection_string 
 
  delay_in_seconds=random (10-100)  
  pause(delay_in_seconds) //introduce a random delay  
 end If 
 
 
 //connect to database according to intrusion detection decision 
 connect_database(connectionstring)   
 result=execute_SQL() 
 
 return result 
end do 
 
This algorithm was run on three sets of 1000 requests. The attacks were embedded on 
those requests for a probability of 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 (Probability 0.1 means out of 10 
requests one is an attack and so on). From the graphs showing the results, we can see that 
the time to deceive is directly proportional to the insufficient authorization attack 
probability. As always, we considered 3 seconds of general service time for any requests 




































































Based on our generated simulation data we found that there can be a total of 2880 attacks 
in a day with an attack probability of 0.1. We considered 3 seconds of general service 
time spent for any kinds of request made to the server which includes network delay, 
service discovery time, connecting time to the SOA port, authentication time for a user, 
detection time for an attack, redirection time to a real database service/ Honeypot. Using 
deception we reduced the number of attacks to 155. Therefore we reduced 2725 attacks 
out of 2880 attacks when the attack probability is 0.1; this is a 95% reduction in attacks. 
Thus we reduced 113 attacks in an hour or 1.8 attacks in a minute.  
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For attack probability 0.2 we found that only 98 attacks are possible to the web service 
because of the deception time introduced to the hacker. This saves the system from 5662 
attacks in a day, 236 attacks in an hour, and 3.9 attacks in a minute. This is a 98% 
reduction in attacks. Again for attack probability of 0.3 this system will permit 155 
attacks out of 8640 attacks to a system and therefore it will save 8485 attacks a day, 353 
























The objective of our work was to use deception for web services in a Service Oriented 
Architecture as a means of reducing attacks. Our results show that deception is a 
successful technique to secure web services. In our work we proposed deception to work 
on top of Web Services. We selected three kinds of attacks and implemented those in our 
work. We showed that the proposed technique we developed would significantly reduce 
the percentage of attack to the web services. Our approach can kill the percentage of time 
an attacker spends in attacking, therefore proportionately the time the attacker is involved 
in attack a service would be less when compared to a scheme where deception is not 
employed. Moreover, this technique would also help to eventually outrace back the 
attacker by deceiving him and collecting information from him. 
 
This work can be extended to the implementation of all the attacks described above. We 
have only implemented three kinds of attack models in this work.  
 
In addition to this there is a scope to compare the performance of this system to the 
typical intrusion detection and prevention technique.  
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In this work we limited our scope within the boundary of a local area network whereas 
for web services there is no organizational boundary and hence this system should be 
deployed on the internet for measuring the performance of the system.  
 
In our prototype we only implemented some ways to prevent a particular attack but in the 
real world attack can be widely diversified and in this scenario our system may not 
provide very good performance; therefore this implementation can be expanded to 
prevent large scale attacks.  
 
An attacker can be redirected to several places and future work will also investigate 
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The Web service client was configured by the following files to connect to the server. In 
Microsoft Visual Studio there are options to bind a web service consumer with a service 











  <contractRef ref="http://deepak-pc/WebService.asmx?wsdl" 
docRef="http://deepak-pc/WebService.asmx" 
xmlns="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/disco/scl/" /> 
  <soap address="http://deepak-pc/WebService.asmx" 
xmlns:q1="SQLInjction" binding="q1:SQLInjSoap" 
xmlns="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/disco/soap/" /> 












Instead of UDDI we used service discovery files to directly map the server to the client. 
Implementing UDDI requires a strong tool like IBM Websphere to implement. However, 
Microsoft Visual Studio generates discovery map file if we use the visual tools to map a 











  <Results> 








  </Results> 
</DiscoveryClientResultsFile> 
 
Figure A.2: The Discovery Map File for Web Service Consumer 
 
Microsoft Visual Studio generates WSDL files for only service consumers and not for the 
servers. Instead of writing WSDL files, GUI tools can be used to generate this WSDL 
file. 











  <wsdl:types> 
    <s:schema elementFormDefault="qualified" 
targetNamespace="SQLInjction"> 





















           <s:element minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1" name="user" 
type="s:string" /> 
            <s:element minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1" name="password" 
type="s:string" /> 
          </s:sequence> 
        </s:complexType> 
      </s:element> 
      <s:element name="VerifyLoginResponse"> 
        <s:complexType> 
          <s:sequence> 
            <s:element minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1" 
name="VerifyLoginResult" type="s:int" /> 
         </s:sequence> 
        </s:complexType> 
      </s:element> 
    </s:schema> 
  </wsdl:types> 
 <wsdl:message name="VerifyLoginSoapIn"> 
    <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="tns:VerifyLogin" /> 
  </wsdl:message> 
  <wsdl:message name="VerifyLoginSoapOut"> 
    <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="tns:VerifyLoginResponse" 
/> 
  </wsdl:message> 
  <wsdl:portType name="SQLInjSoap"> 
    <wsdl:operation name="VerifyLogin"> 
      <wsdl:input message="tns:VerifyLoginSoapIn" /> 
      <wsdl:output message="tns:VerifyLoginSoapOut" /> 
    </wsdl:operation> 
 </wsdl:portType> 
  <wsdl:binding name="SQLInjSoap" type="tns:SQLInjSoap"> 
    <soap:binding transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http" 
/> 
    <wsdl:operation name="VerifyLogin"> 
      <soap:operation soapAction="SQLInjction/VerifyLogin" 
style="document" /> 
      <wsdl:input> 
        <soap:body use="literal" /> 
       
</wsdl:input> 
      <wsdl:output> 
        <soap:body use="literal" /> 
     </wsdl:output> 
    </wsdl:operation> 
  </wsdl:binding> 
  <wsdl:binding name="SQLInjSoap12" type="tns:SQLInjSoap"> 
    <soap12:binding 
transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http" /> 
    <wsdl:operation name="VerifyLogin"> 
     <soap12:operation soapAction="SQLInjction/VerifyLogin" 
style="document" /> 
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